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Abstract— Network attacks have become prominent in the modern-day web 
activities and the black hat community have also gain more sophistication with 
the tools used to penetrate poorly guarded or unguarded networks. Network 
security administrators have also moved swiftly to counter the threats posed by 
the attacker with different network intrusion detection and monitoring tools. 
Low interaction honeypots were developed to entice hackers without causing 
any serious downtime to the production network, so that their activities and the 
way they access the network can be studied with a minimal setup cost. In this 
work, a low interaction virtual honeypot using the Honeyd daemon to lure 
attackers to the network and alert the attacker's activities in the network using 
the Snort IDS. The data captured is analysed based on the protocol and port 
used. It is then validated by analysing the attacker's activities once it is logged 
and accessed through Wireshark protocol analyser. 
Keywords/Index Terms—Low Interaction Honeypot, High Interaction 
Honeypot, Intrusion Detection and Prevention, Traffic monitoring 
 
 
1. Introduction 
According to the survey carried out by 
(Richardson, 2010), Cyber-attacks have 
become a pertinent issue that have cost 
organisations worldwide an estimated 
$150 million stating that much of attack 
targeted to organisations ranks from 
Malware infection 67%, Fraudulently 
represented as a sender of phishing mail 
37%, laptop or mobile hardware theft or 
loss 34% and Denial of service 17%. 
During the past decade, there has been 
numerous network security tools 
developed for organisations which 
includes Firewalls and NIDS. Firewall 
for example, helps protect these 
organisations by preventing an attacker 
from gaining access to the internal 
network and tools such as NIDS allows 
organisations to detect and identify 
attacks, provide mechanisms that react 
to the detected attacks or at the barest 
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minimum, reduces the effect of the 
attack. But because attackers always 
come with new tricks and these tools 
lacks the functionality of detecting or 
fending off the newer attacks and the 
collection of more information about the 
attacker's activities, skills and methods. 
For example, Signature based IDS's 
does not contain the attack signature of 
a newer attack in its signature database, 
therefore it will allow an attack to get 
through to the network if its signature is 
different from the one contained its 
database. 
Nowadays, for organisations to protect 
their networks and build efficient 
security systems, it is necessary for 
network security system developers to 
gain the attackers knowledge and attack 
plots (Anuar, et al., 2006). Many non-
profit organisations and educational 
institutions have spent time to research 
into cyber-attacks and analyse the 
methods and tactics used by the so-
called Black hat community which act 
against organisations production 
network. 
An important network tool that is used 
by different organisation to monitor the 
Black hat community is the Honeypot. 
According to (Provos & Holz, 2008), a 
honeypot is a closely monitored 
computing resource that we want to be 
probed, attacked or compromised. It is a 
form a decoy system that is set up to 
detect or confuse unauthorised attempts 
on information systems. Honeypots also 
allows us to analyse how attackers 
explore system and network 
vulnerabilities. Because honeypots have 
no production values it constitutes an 
extra cost when it is being set up in a 
production network because of the extra 
network components that is required for 
the setup. As suggested by (Ayeni, 
Alese and Omotosho 2013) Intrusion 
detection has become a very delicate 
matter over the last few years within the 
broad realm of network security.  With 
so much advancement in hacking, if 
attackers try hard enough, they will 
eventually succeed in infiltrating the 
system. Therefore, there is a need to 
constantly or periodically monitor what 
is taking place on a system and look for 
suspicious behaviour. Vulnerabilities in 
common security components such as 
firewalls, security patches, access 
control and encryption are inevitable, so 
hackers take advantage of these 
shortcomings to infiltrate the system. 
(Sabah & Vandana, 2013) To reduce 
cost, low interaction honeypots were 
developed which will simulate the 
network components instead of 
incurring the cost of setting up the high 
interaction counterpart with lesser 
sophistication and richness of data as the 
alternative forgone. This report focuses 
on the low interaction technique for 
honeypot deployment. 
 
2. Background and related work 
Network attacks as defined by 
(Ghorbani, et al., 2010) ―is a set of 
malicious activities to disrupt, deny, 
degrade or destroy information and 
service resident in computer networks‖. 
Streaming of data through a network is 
the main source of attack on that 
network and its aim is to disrupt the 
traffic going through that network and 
making the network vulnerable to other 
attacks by reducing its integrity and 
confidentiality. Network attacks ranges 
from an individual receiving an 
obnoxious email from another 
individual to attack on the components 
of a network, important information and 
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critical data. Examples of attacks on 
computers include email viruses, 
worms, Trojan horses, unauthorised 
access, amending data on a system by 
taking advantage of a bug on the 
software. To perpetrate these attacks, 
the methods used by the attackers can be 
generalised into Masquerading, Social 
Engineering, Vulnerability Scanning 
and functionality abuse. 
Social Engineering attack is used to 
mislead its prey by persuading them 
aggressively to give their authentication 
details (Amitabh, et al., 2004). 
Examples are email phishing and Trojan 
Horse; Masquerading attack is when the 
attacker poses as a legitimate user in a 
network to gain higher privileges than 
they should i.e. logging in as an 
administrator into a network which they 
are not. This is achieved by bypassing 
the means of authentication with stolen 
logon passwords and user identities; 
Vulnerability scanning methods are 
software bugs attached to a legitimate 
program which the attacker uses to 
obtain access illegally to a system. 
Examples include improper handling of 
temporary files, race conditions and 
buffer overflows. 
In order to manage honeypot system 
using web interface, (Anuar, et al., 
2006) created Honeyd@WEB. Through 
web interface, Honeyd@WEB was used 
to design a low-involvement (low-
interaction), production, dynamic and 
manageable honeypot. It combines 
techniques such as "Deception ports" on 
production network to simulate 
honeypot services which are used in 
place of well-known services such as 
HTTP, POP, DNS and FTP and 
"proximity Decoys" where honeypots 
decoys are situated very close to the 
production host i.e. in the same local 
subnet. The main purpose of their 
research was to detect real systems and 
the Honeyd@WEB solution was 
deployed in the internal network to 
detect internal attackers.  
Similarly, they also used the 
Honeyd@WEB to detect firewalls that 
are not configured properly and to detect 
worms and Trojans. 
(Vollmer and Manic 2014), created a 
deceptive virtual host (low interaction 
honeypot) by combining 3 components 
namely: 
- Network Entity Identification (NEI). 
- Dynamic Virtual Host (DVH) 
configuration. 
- Virtual Host Instantiation (VHI). 
The NEI component is used to monitor 
the network traffic by extracting the 
source, destination and activities of each 
port. They evaluated tools like P0f, 
Ettercap, Snort, TCPdump and Ntop to 
provide network host identification. 
The DVH component is configured 
using Honeyd as it provides autonomous 
configuration with low expenses as 
compared to the manual (High 
interaction honeypot) configuration. Its 
main objective is to automatically 
configure and update a random amount 
of virtual host dynamically based on the 
data it gathered from the actual host 
using Ettercap. The DVH components 
was described in 4 sections namely OS 
selection, OS name mapping, MAC 
creation and Network service emulation. 
The VHI and update component is used 
to instantiate the virtual host. They 
created an initial configuration file and 
made changes to the configuration file 
of the virtual host running under 
Honeyd while the system is running. 
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(Kaur and Saini 2013), created a 
Honeynet to analyse network traffic and 
prevent attacks on protocol and port 
basis. The Honeynet was deployed to 
capture keystrokes of the attacker's 
activities and the captured data was 
analysed for the purpose research. 
Honeyd was used as the low interaction 
honeypot to create virtual host and 
simulate some services on them 
including TCP, UDP and ICMP. For the 
high interaction honeypot, a real host 
running on Windows XP SP2 operating 
system was used and Sebek-win-3.0.5 
was also used as the data capture tool. A 
Honeywall is also configured in the 
setup with all three NIC's attached to the 
Honeywall system used at once. The 
Honeywall connected the Honeynet 
(Low and High interaction honeypot) 
and the production network in a bridge 
mode. This bridge mode made it very 
difficult for the attacker to detect the 
honeypot. 
The Honeywall was configured not to 
have any IP address except for the 
interface connected to the management 
machine. This feature enables the 
Honeywall to appear in a stealth mode 
and transparently control and detect all 
information that moves across it. When 
malicious activities are detected, it is 
forwarded to the Honeynet machines i.e. 
(the Low and High interactions 
honeypots) and the activities are logged 
and the data captured are analysed. 
HPing3 was used to launch attacks on 
the honeypots from a computer 
connected to the production network, 
the attacks launched includes: SYN flag, 
DoS, Smurf attack and flooding by 
using IP spoofing. The honeypots could 
capture the launched attacks and the 
types of attacks were shown using the 
Sebek software. 
 
3. System Architecture 
The architectural model of the 
implemented virtual honeypot network 
is shown in Figure 1 and it is achieved 
using the Honeyd software to simulate 
the virtual hosts that can be interactive 
with an attacker and used to provide 
arbitrary services like TCP, UDP and 
ICMP to deceive the attacker into 
thinking that it is communicating with a 
real computer on a real network. 
 Although the Honeyd software can also 
be configured to log the activities of the 
attacker, the Snort IDS/IPS software 
was used for the logging of these 
activities because it provides a more 
powerful analysis and signature 
categorisation of the attacker's activities.  
Both software provides both logging 
and analysis characteristics and to make 
this work more robust, the Wireshark 
network protocol analyser was selected 
to give detail analysis of the attacker’s 
activities on the network by monitoring 
the inflow and outflow of data across 
the host computer on the interface 
connected to the internet which is also 
configured as the same port where the 
honeypot and the IDS/IPS in listening 
to. 
The system architecture in Figure 1 
shows the experimental design of the 
proposed technique for the deployment 
of the IDS/IPS system. As seen from the 
diagram, the IDS system is placed 
behind a firewall. The firewall helps 
filters traffic between a protected 
(internal) network and an unprotected 
(external) network. This also helps to 
make the attacker thinks he is attacking 
a real network. 
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It also keeps unwanted packets from 
entering the protected network. 
Honeypots can either be placed in the 
front of a firewall, in the DMZ, or 
behind a firewall. When dealing with 
IDS/IPS networks, as suggested by 
(Annamma , et al., 2011) it is always a 
good practice to setup the honeypots 
behind the firewall to appear as a 
legitimate network to the intruder. 
Therefore, for this design, I have chosen 
to implement the Honeypot behind the 
firewall to be in accordance to industry 
standard and to preserve the 
authentication of the Honeypot concept. 
 
3.1. Virtual Honeypot Implementation 
The virtual host is used to simulate 
network delay and packet loss rate. The 
simulated network consists two virtual 
host and two Cisco routers. The virtual 
router 1running as Cisco 2600 series 
personality is used to separate the 
network 192.168.7.0/24 and the network 
172.16.0.0/24. Virtual router 2 also 
running on the cisco 2600 personality is 
used to separate the network 
172.16.0.0/24 and the network 
172.20.0.0/24. Virtual router 1 access 
address is 172.16.0.1 and the virtual 
router 2 access address is 172.20.0.1.  
The virtual host 1 in the 172.16.0.0/24 
network with the IP address 
172.16.0.2/24, running on the Linux 
2.6.20-1 as the personality, while the 
virtual host 2 is on the network 
172.20.0.0/24 network with the IP 
address 172.20.0.2/24 and running 
Windows XP professional as its 
personality.
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FIGURE 1. IMPLEMENTED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 
 
 
 
The Virtual Honeypot
Internet
Virtual Host 1
Linux 2.6.20-1
IP: 172.16.0.2
Network Switch
Network firewall
Virtual Router 2
Cisco 2600
IP: 172.20.0.1
Virtual Router 1
Cisco 2600
IP: 172.16.0.1
Virtual host 2
Windows XP professional
IP: 172.20.0.2
ADSL Router
IP: 192.168.7.6
Attacking Host 
IP: 192.168.7.211
Host Computer
running on Ubuntu 12.04.5 
LTS Desktop
IP: 192.168.7.55
Data control: Honeyd
Data capture: Snort
Data analysis: Wireshark
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3.2 Configuring the Honeyd 
When configuring the Honeyd software 
to set up the virtual honeypot, it must be 
ensured that IP forwarding is disabled 
on the host computer that houses the 
Honeyd (Provos & Holz, 2008).If IP 
forwarding is enabled, then IP packets 
which the Honeyd receives for the 
virtual honeypots are forwarded to 
another computer in the 192.168.7.0 
network where the host computer is 
located. In order to disable IP 
forwarding, the command below was 
issued on the host computer:  
 
echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward 
 
Before running Honeyd, it was ensured 
that the host computer can answer to all 
ARP requests which are sent by the 
router for the IPs of the virtual 
honeypots. This is achieved using the 
farpd tool for spoofing the ARP requests 
(Provos, 2008). It listens on the host 
network interface, i.e. the 192.168.7.0 
network interface and responds with the 
MAC address of the Honeyd for the 
received ARP requests on the 
corresponding IP addresses. The 
incoming packets can be received 
through the Honeyd network interface 
with the help of the farpd. It allows for 
easy monitoring and capturing traffics 
which are sent to the virtual honeypots. 
This is achieved by running the 
following command on the host 
computer: 
farpd <IP address of virtual honeypot]> 
-i eth0 
where eth0 is the physical network 
interface of the host computer. shell), 
TCP port 20 (FTP), TCP port 88 
(Kerberos authentication system) and 
UDP port 161 (SNMP). These ports are 
set to open for the attacker to establish 
connections to the virtual honeypot 
network only and it's not made to run 
any scripts or log any activities as these 
activities are implemented with the snort 
IDS system. The drop action is used to 
drop the entire packet to the port by 
default. Honeyd runs as a background 
process and as a user nobody which 
provides the security embedded within 
the Honeyd framework. In order to run 
the Honeyd configuration from the 
honeyd.conf file, the following 
command was issued on the host 
computer 
Some part of the main commands used 
in the Honeyd configuration file to set 
up the virtual honeypot network is 
shown in table 1: 
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TABLE I. HONEYD CONFIGURATION COMMAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The create command creates a template 
whose personality is 'linux' and it binds the 
honeypot's IP address to the personality. The 
set and add commands is used to change the 
configuration of the personality. The set 
command helps to assign the personality 
"linux 2,6.20-1 (Fedora Core S)" from the 
Nmap fingerprinting file. The uptime of the 
host shows how long the system has been 
running. The uptime was spoofed to be 
equal to 60 days i.e. 5184000 seconds to 
give enough room from the time of writing 
the configuration of the virtual honeypot to 
the time when the attack will be simulated. 
The add command opens the ports on the 
virtual honeypot, and specifies which 
services should run on each port. For the 
attacker to feel that it is attacking a real 
system on a real network, the open action is 
used to open most of the well-known ports 
such as the TCP port 23 (telnet), TCP port 
22 (secure: 
 # honeyd -d -i eth0 172.16.0.0/16  
172.20.0.0/16 -f/etc/honeypot/honeyd.conf 
At this point, Honeyd start listening on eth0 
interface and answering to the packets for 
the network address 172.16.0.0/16 and 
172.20.0.0/16 respectively of the configured 
virtual honeypots. 
 
####### Honeyd configuration file ############# 
create linux 
set linux personality "linux 2.6.20-1 (Fedora Core S)" 
set linux uptime 5184000 # sixty days 
set 172.16.0.2 ethernet "3f:12:4e:14:d0:32" 
set linux default tcp action block 
set linux ethernet "Dell" 
add linux tcp port 23 open 
add linux tcp port 22 open 
add linux tcp port 20 open 
add linux tcp port 88 open 
add linux udp port 161 0pen 
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Ping, Nmap, telnet and traceroute tools was 
used to test that the Honeyd installation is 
working as configured and also to see if it is 
correctly receiving network traffic. 
 
3.3 Configuring the Snort IDS 
According to (Roesch, et al., 2015), Mostly 
all network cards have features named 
"Large Receive Offload" (lro) and "Generic 
Receive Offload" (gro). With these features 
enabled, the network card performs packet 
reassembly before they become processed 
by the kernel. Therefore, it is recommended 
to turn off both the LRO and GRO because 
Snort will truncate packets larger than the 
default snaplen of 1518 bytes. To disable 
LRO and GRO the following command was 
run on the host computer:  
 
sudo apt-get install -y ethool 
sudo ethool -K eth0 gro off 
sudo ethool -K eth0 lro off 
 
 
After snort was installed, some files and 
directories which are required by snort were 
created and permissions were set on the 
files. Snort keeps all configurations and rule 
files in etc/snort, and all alerts generated by 
Snort will be logged to /var/log/snort. This 
is achieved running the following 
commands on the host network 
 
sudo groupadd snort 
sudo useradd snort -r -s /sbin/nologin -c SNORT_IDS -g snort 
sudo mkdir /etc/snort 
sudo mkdir /etc/snort/rules 
sudo mkdir /etc/snort/preproc_rules 
sudo touch /etc/snort/rules/white_list.rules /etc/snort/rules/black_list.rules 
/etc/snort/rules/local.rule 
sudo mkdir  /var/log/snort 
sudo mkdir /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicrule 
sudo chmod -R 5775 /etc/snort 
sudo chmod -R 5775 /var/log/snort 
sudo chmod -R 5775 /usr/local/lib/snort_dyamicrules 
sudo chown -R snort:snort /etc/snort 
sudo chown -R snort:snort /var/log/snort 
sudo chown -R snort:snort /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicrules 
 
 
In order to write the configuration for 
snort to capture the ongoing 
communications with the different 
protocols configured on the Honeyd, the 
Snort configurations file at 
etc/snort/snort.conf. When snort is run 
with this file as an argument, it tells 
snort to run in NIDS mode. 
Before Snort is ran, some edits were 
made to the default configuration file by 
commenting out of individual rule files 
that are referenced in the snort 
configuration file. The following line of 
command was used to out all the ruleset 
in the snort.conf file 
 
sudo sed -i 's/include \$RULE_PATH/#include \$RULE\_PATH/ ' /etc/snort/snort.conf 
 
   56 
 
Marcos Rodrigues & Olamilekan Shobayo                                                        CJICT  (2017)  5(1) 48-64 
            
 
                       
 
 
In order to change the configuration file, Gedit text editor was installed and the 
following command was used to edit the snort.conf file 
   sudo gedit /etc/snort/snort.conf 
 
Because the attack sequence to be 
alerted by the Snort software were to be 
simulated, the Snort rules to capture the 
costumed attack signatures as written in 
the local.rule configuration file. The 
local.rule file was enabled by 
uncommenting the #include 
$RULE_PATH/local.rule. Once the 
configuration file is ready, Snort will 
verify that the file is valid and all the 
necessary files that it references were 
correct. 
Currently, Snort does not have any 
loaded rules i.e., the rule files referenced 
in snort.conf is empty. The Snort rule 
was written into the 
etc//snort/rules/local.rule. By 
uncommenting the #include 
$RULE_PATH/local.rule on the Snort 
configuration file, Snort was instructed 
that the local.rule files should be loaded. 
When Snort loads the file on start up, it 
will see the rule that was created and the 
rule will be implemented on all traffic 
incoming and outgoing on the eth0 
interface.  
To alert every ICMP packets that is 
moving through the eth0 interface, the 
following command was written into the 
etc/snort/rules/local.rule file 
 
  alert ICMP any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ICMP alert" ; sid :10000001; rev:001;) 
 
The diagram in Figure 2 shows the captured message on the Snort console. 
                     
              FIGURE 3. SHOWING THE RULE PORT COUNT 
As seen from the Figure 2 above, the 
Snort IDS have could detect rules for 
any ICMP, UDP and TCP packets that is 
destined for the host computer through 
the eth0 interface. Snort was then started 
in the NIDS mode, and was told to 
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output any alert directly to the console. 
Snort was run from the command line 
using the following flags 
: 
-A console The 'console' option prints fast mode alert to stdout 
-q Quiet mode. Don’t show banner and status report 
-u snort Run Snort as the following user after startup 
-g snort Run Snort as the following group after startup 
-c /etc/snort/snort.conf The path to the snort.conf file 
-i eth0 The interface to listen to 
 
  The command issued according to the flag listed above is shown thus:  
sudo /usr/local/bin/snort -A console -q -u snort 
-g snort -c /etc.snort/snort.conf -i eth0 
 
 
3.4 Configuring the Wireshark 
The host system is configured with a DEB-based distribution, i.e. the Ubuntu 12.04.4 
LTS operating system, Wireshark was installed from system repositories through the 
terminal window and the following commands were used: 
 Sudo apt-get install wireshark 
 
4. Validation of Result 
In this section, some validation test was 
carried out to verify the workability of 
the implemented system by carrying out 
different attack simulation on the system 
setup. 
Hping3 (Sanfilippo, 2010) was used to 
launch simulated attack on the virtual 
honeypot setup to test the functionality 
of the system. The simulation does not 
actually project a hacking scenario, it 
proves to be effective in checking how 
the virtual honeypot works, how the 
Snort IDS logs the simulated attack 
sequence and how the data is captured 
using the Wireshark network protocol 
analyzer. The hping3 was installed in 
the attacking host shown in the diagram 
in Figure 1. Attacks to simulate the 
launching TCP, UDP and ICMP packets 
are being directed to the honeypot setup. 
The command that is used to carry out 
the attack sequence is the hping3 
command. It requires administrative 
privileges to run it from the attacking 
host machine. The attacking host 
machine is presumed to be located on 
the production network i.e. it simulates 
that an attacker has hacked into the 
production network and has gained 
access to the network facilities with the 
rights to communicate with every 
computer on the production network 
including the virtual honeypots setup 
with the aim of bringing down the 
network and causing downtime. 
A general hping3 command that can be 
used to send attacking packets to a host 
is shown below 
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#hping3 <victim IP> -V –c 1000000 –d 512 –S –w 32 –flood –rand-source 
 
Also, to spoof the source IP address, the –a command option can be used. When the 
spoofing option is used, the source IP of the attacker is concealed, albeit the honeypot 
system still detects the attack. The command option used by hping3 is shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Scenario 1: Use of TCP SYN Flag to Flood the Host Machine 
The command used to create a TCP SYN flag flood on the attacker’s machine is shown 
below 
 
  #hping3 <Victim’s IP> -V -c 10000 –d 512 –S –w 32 --flood 
 
Immediately the command is run from 
the attacking host, connection is setup 
with the honeypot and data is being 
received through the TCP protocol. To 
receive TCP connection with the host 
computer, it uses the SYN flag and an 
acknowledgement is received for the 
connection. As soon as a connection is 
established, the command allows TCP 
packets to flood the host (victim’s) 
computer. These activities are captured 
and logged against the Snort IDS rule 
and the result  
is output to its console. The Wireshark 
application is also started to listen on the 
eth0 interface where the virtual 
honeypot (Honeyd) and the Snort IDS is 
also configured. The figure 3 below 
shows the data that was logged and 
captured
. 
 
                         
                        FIGURE 3. SNORT ALERT OF THE TCP FLOOD 
 
V Verbose-mode 
c Packet-count 
d Data-size 
S SYN flag 
w Window-size 
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Data from Figure 3 show that TCP 
packets are being sent from a source IP 
address of 192.168.7.211 which shows 
that the attacker is on the same subnet as 
the honeypot system. Once the 
command to run the Snort IDS is 
started, the TCP packed flood begins to 
be logged on the console. The first line 
from the figure shows how both host 
negotiates connections with every 
packet sent and every alert logged. An 
acknowledgment is also received at the 
reverse end of the communication. The 
host system established the connection 
using a dynamically assigned port 
number which it held for the length of 
the communication, while the assigned 
outgoing TCP port of the attacking host 
increases with a value of 1 for the next 
establishment of connection. The log 
also shows the output message 
configured on the local.rule file of the 
Snort IDS, showing both the sequence 
number and the priority level of the rule. 
 
                                          
                            
                            FIGURE 4. WIRESHARK CAPTURED TCP DATA 
 
The Wireshark provides more insight to 
the TCP attack flood, when it is filtered 
to express TCP transactions only. The 
details from the frame number 37 
selected above depicts a sent TCP frame 
from the attacker’s machine. It shows 
the attacking host MAC address and the 
type of computer from which the attack 
is propagated (in this case a VMware 
machine). This data can help to track the 
location of the attacker and to prosecute 
them. It also shows the aggregated 
amount of flow, source byte, source 
packet, and destination flow and 
destination packets. The large amount of 
TCP flow confirms the flooded data 
from source to destination. 
 
4.2 Scenario 2: Use of UDP Packets to 
Flood the Host Machine 
The command used to launch the UDP 
flood attack on the honeypot system in 
this scenario is shown below: 
 
 
   #hping3 <Victim’s IP> -V -c 10000 –d 512 –S –w 32 -2 --flood 
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The difference from the command used 
to flood the TCP packets is the -2 
command. It is the hping3 command hat 
is used to flood UDP packets. The 
default command without the -2 will 
only launch TCP packets. Since UDP 
does not require a connection 
establishment like the TCP, the 
attacking host starts sending packets 
immediately the command is run. The 
Snort IDS alert is shown in Figure 5.
 
 
                          
           
                         FIGURE 5. SNORT CAPTURE OF UDP FLOOD PACKETS 
 
 
The Snort IDS logs an ICMP packet 
every time a UDP packet is sent to the 
honeypot system. The hping3 tool uses 
the ICMP to generate a form of 
connection with the host before flooding 
it with the UDP packet. The destination 
port is 0 but all the unassigned port 
numbers between 0-65535 was used by 
the attacking host to flood the UDP 
packets. 
The Wireshark capture also depicts both 
the ICMP and UDP packets and the 
highlighted UDP packet also shows the 
time the packet is sent in seconds, the 
source and destination address of the 
UDP packet. The Figure 6 below shows 
the Wireshark capture 
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                         FIGURE 6. WIRESHARK UDP FLOOD CAPTURE                    
 
4.3 Scenario 3: Use of ICMP Packets to Flood the Host Machine 
 
The command used to launch the ICMP flood attack on the honeypot system in this 
scenario is shown below: 
 
#hping3 <Victim’s IP> -V -c 10000 –d 512 –S –w 32 -1 --flood  
 
The -1 command of the hping3 was used to generate the ICMP packet in this scenario. 
The Snort IDS capture is shown Figure 7. 
 
                                  
                   
                    FIGURE 7. SNORT CAPTURE OF THE ICMP FLOOD  
                                    
As seen from figure 7, the rule captured 
the ICMP packets coming from the 
attacking host computer and it was 
logged on the console of the Snort IDS. 
The source, destination and port 
numbers are shown as well. 
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5. Conclusion  
In this paper, a virtual honeypot setup 
that combines Intrusion Detection 
System has been presented. It can 
capture all types data proposed to be 
used to attack the network which 
includes TCP, UDP and ICMP, and it 
also gives a lot of information about the 
attacking protocols via the Wireshark 
network analyzing tool. Alerts from the 
Snort IDS console and captures from 
Wireshark reveals the protocols the 
attacker is using. 
Honeypots whether physical or virtual 
are meant to emulate real production 
networks at a level of operation, mostly 
deploying the protocols that attackers 
find interesting to obliterate. It is not of 
full guarantee that a network would be 
attacked or spoofed and most of the 
security defense system might just end 
up being redundant. This option will be 
sure to provide a cheaper solution for 
the decoy system. 
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